Briefing Paper

Accelerating Just Energy Transition in Indonesia

Background

At the CO28 in 2023, as the result of the first global stocktake (GST1), Parties agreed to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), limiting the average global temperature rise not to exceed 1.5°C through, among others, transitioning away from fossil fuels in the energy system in a just, orderly, and equitable manner (Decision 1/CMA.5, 28(d)). The decision signals the global call to gradually end fossil fuels—not only coal, but also oil and gas—in the energy systems. At the COP30 in Belém, COP30 Presidency announced that the Presidency would lead the development of a global roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels. At the same time, the first international conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels was announced to be co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands, in April 2026.

While the agenda is gaining traction after COP30, it is important to understand how transitioning away from fossil fuels is translated and understood in every country, considering the diverse socio-economic implications that the transition presents to each country. This paper aims to provide an overview of how fossil fuels transition is currently being carried out in Indonesia, how the country can leverage existing programs and policies.

Why it Matters: Indonesia's Context

Indonesia's economy remains deeply entangled with fossil fuels in ways that generate substantial and compounding socio-economic costs. **In 2024, fossil fuels supplied 82% of the country's electricity, with coal alone powering around 61.5% of power generation** (Ember, 2026), making Indonesia one of the most coal-dependent major economies in the world. This dependence imposes severe fiscal burdens: **in 2024, Indonesia spent IDR 713.5 trillion (approximately USD 45 billion) on energy subsidies, with nearly 90% allocated to fossil fuels** (IISD, 2026), while total fossil fuel subsidies including implicit costs such as coal price caps and unpriced externalities reached approximately USD 170 billion, equivalent to 11.2% of GDP (IEEFA, 2026). At the same time, **the country is the world's largest thermal coal exporter and third-largest coal producer**, employing approximately 160.000 coal miners. This implies that **the fossil fuel economy is deeply embedded in regional labor markets and fiscal structures,** with coal mining constituting up to 35% of local GDP and 4-8% of employment in the most coal-dependent Province of East Kalimantan (Jakarta Globe, 2023).

Indonesia's continued reliance on imported crude oil and natural gas further exposes the national budget to volatile global commodity markets, as demonstrated when the current Middle East conflict which has pushed oil prices past USD 100 per barrel and ballooned subsidy expenditures with an enormous addition of more than USD 11 billion expenditure. This structural lock-in simultaneously drains public finance, while it could be directed toward developing necessary enabling conditions to transition away from fossil fuels (IEEFA, 2025).

Beyond the immediate fiscal drain of subsidies and import bills, **the costs of maintaining fossil fuel will also be reflected in the rising cost of climate impacts.** As the world's largest archipelagic state, Indonesia is among the most climate-vulnerable major economies with approximately 42 million people live within 10 meters above sea level (UNEP Grid). **In the absence of urgent action, the country stands to lose up to 4.4% of its GDP by 2050, rising to 13.27% by 2100** (G20 Climate Risk Atlas). Under a scenario where global temperatures rise by 2.0-2.6°C by mid-century, it is estimated that Indonesia's GDP could shrink by 16.7% to 30.2% (UNEP Grid). These projected losses are threatening to poverty reduction and development gains across multiple sectors such as agriculture—which supports 29% of the working population (UC Berkeley)—as well as fisheries, coastal infrastructure, and urban livelihoods.

Existing Initiatives to Phase Down Fossil Fuels

The country has already put in place policies and institutional frameworks that can form the backbone of a credible transition pathway, if properly leveraged and implemented. These include Indonesia's greenhouse emissions reduction target in its NDCs, NZE 2060 adoption in formal regulations, imposing on-grid coal moratorium, improvements on renewable energy supporting regulation, and the recent plan to accelerate renewable energy phase-in through 100 GW solar projects. These existing policy instruments represent real, tangible entry points that should be fully mobilized and coherently aligned to ensure that Indonesia is not just able to deliver ambitious climate commitment, but also to capture the economic opportunities of transitioning away from fossil fuel such as fiscal savings and reallocation, improved livelihoods, green jobs and decent work opportunities.

As a country that is still developing, providing equitable and reliable access to energy has been a priority for Indonesia, regardless the form of energy resources. However, with the growing concerns over energy security and rising ambition to achieve self-sufficiency, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) is now gradually shifting to localized energy resources, including from renewable energy.

1. Dedieselization Program

The dedieselization program was first introduced by the GoI in 2020, aiming at reducing diesel power generation, particularly in the isolated regions which are not integrated to the PLN grid. The economic imperative of this program is to reduce Indonesia's oil import, considering its high cost and volatility amidst the geopolitical tensions. In 2024, the government reported that the national spending for diesel imports reached IDR 318.8 trillion (USD 20 billion) annually. Diesel distribution to these isolated regions also becomes an additional financial burden. The cost of diesel power generation fluctuated from IDR 4.746 (USD 0.37) per kWh in 2020 to IDR 8.748 (USD 0.57) per kWh in 2023 (IEEFA, 2026). The price may rise higher due to the current geopolitical tension due to the Hormuz crisis. The dedieselization program intends to increase the renewable energy mix and support the NZE 2060 target achievement. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) 2025-2034, there are 5.270 units of diesel power generation spreading across Indonesia, and 3.378 of which will be closed by 2034 as part of the dedieselization program.

The dedieselization program in Indonesia is carried out through three measures: 1) converting the diesel power generation to renewable energy-based power plants; 2) gasification and developing gas power plants; 3) connecting the isolated system to the grid. The approach of replacing diesel power generation to renewable-based offers a crucial **opportunity to reduce Indonesia's dependence on fossil fuels in its electricity system.** Moreover, this conversion helps Indonesia **reduce its fossil fuel imports, which could potentially lead to budget savings and strengthen Indonesia's energy security during disruptions to the global energy supply chain.**

2. 100 GW Solar Power Plants by 2028

The GoI is planning to develop 100 GW of solar power plants by 2028 as part of its energy sovereignty program. The 100 GW capacity is divided into two parts. The 80 GW for decentralized solar PV which will be managed by cooperatives (Koperasi Desa Merah Putih) in 80.000 villages. It will be supported by 320 GWh of battery energy storage system (BESS). The remaining 20 GW will be implemented by the state's electricity company or PLN. The large portion of this solar PV program is intended for substituting the diesel-based power in isolated regions. Thus, **aligning the PLN's dedieselization program and the 100 GW solar PV objective is crucial to accelerate renewable energy deployment in Indonesia.**

The RUPTL 2025-2034 already includes around 30.5 GW of solar power plant development, covering utility scale solar projects, rooftop solar deployment, village electrification programs, and initiatives linked to dedieselization programs. Moreover, there are several policies are already in place and are expected to enable solar power deployment in the country, such as the Presidential Regulation Number 112 of 2022 on the Acceleration of Renewable Energy Development for Electricity Supply, MEMR Regulation Number 2 of 2024 on Rooftop Solar Power Plants, MEMR Regulation Number 5 of 2025 which provides a guideline for renewable power purchase agreements between PLN and independent power producers (IPPs), and MEMR Regulation Number 19 of 2025 on Hybrid Power Plants. **However, the policy package has not been able to rollout massive solar power development in Indonesia.** Centralized governance in the energy sector has been identified as a significant barrier to unlocking the country's solar potential. In addition to policy reform to realize the 100 GW program, GoI needs to address other challenges, such as limited capacity of domestic manufacture and human capital. **To date, progress of solar power development remains slow, where solar power only contributes 1,494 MW in Indonesia's electricity mix in 2025** (MEMR, 2025).

3. Early Retirement CFPP

Among the various measures to advance Indonesia's attempt to transition away from fossil fuels, the early retirement of coal-fired power plants (CFPPs) receives the most attention, particularly after Indonesia and IPG countries agreed on a Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) back in 2022 when Indonesia hosted the G20. The government has set the legal foundation for this through Presidential Regulation Number 112 of 2022, which halts the construction of new public coal plants and mandates an early retirement roadmap. A roadmap for energy transition as mandated by the Presidential Regulation, was then developed and formalized through the issuance of MEMR Regulation Number 10 of 2025. The Ministry Regulation showsIndonesia's government efforts to provide legal certainty regarding to the operationalization of early retirement process for CFPP in the electricity sector, both for assets owned by the PLN and IPPs. Certainty is essential to mitigate the financial risks associated with stranded assets while simultaneously building trust with international financing institutions and transitional funding schemes, including the JETP.

Although the legal framework has been established, the implementation of early retirement CFPP still faces significant structural challenges, including the high socio-economic costs. Indonesia has an attempt for early replenishment of CFPP, under which the Cirebon-1 CFPP was chosen. However, the project was cancelled, arguing that the existing regulations do not fully elaborate the socio-economic aspects, hence just transition principles, in the implementation. Despite the shortcomings to incorporating just transition principles, more efforts have still existed to reduce reliance on coal and strengthen environmental protection. Another case on the CFPP cancellation is the Tanjung Jati A Coal-Fired Power Plant, through Decision No. 52/G/LH/2022/PTUN.Bdg. The case was made as an effort to prioritize environmental protection to uphold the precautionary principle.

4. Bioenergy Development

GoI is pursuing bioenergy development as part of the country's energy transition pathways. Bioenergy is also perceived as the key driver for achieving energy sovereignty as it is domestically sourced. **The bioenergy development is intended to reduce the country's reliance on fuel imports, by gradually increasing biofuels blending in diesel.** Due to the significant increase of oil price amid the Hormuz crisis, the GoI aims to expedite the implementation of B50 policy—a mandate to blend 50% biofuel and 50% petroleum diesel—in July 2026, while initially planned for 2027. Although the current palm oil feedstock is adequate to support the implementation, however the measures need to be revisited to reduce the potential conflict between energy and food security, including to reduce the deforestation risks.

Bioenergy development also includes the use of biomass for co-firing power plants. The biomass will reduce the use of coal in the power plant gradually. However, to ensure enough biomass as feedstock for co-firing power plant, a vast land requirement needs to be met. In West Sumba, East Nusa Tenggara province, generating 1 MW of electricity will require 200 hectares to secure the biomass feedstock required. The land requirement is significantly high compared to other renewable energy resources with the same scale electricity generated—1.32 hectares for solar, 1.33 hectares for wind, and 1.3 hectares for geothermal. If biomass is to be pursued, then it will lead to increasing land competition, which potentially drives land use conversion through deforestation.

In addition to that, bioenergy expansion can worsen the risks related to food security, land competition, and mitigation backsliding. This highlights the importance of **cross-sectoral alignment in efforts to reduce GHG emissions.**

5. Domestic Critical Minerals Processing as Enabler

As one of the world's largest reserves of critical minerals, particularly nickel, Indonesia plays a crucial role in the global energy transition. Nickel is a key component in lithium-ion batteries used for electric vehicles (EV) and BESS, both of which are essential technologies for accelerating energy transition. **With 55 million tons or 42.30% of nickel reserves out of total global reserves, Indonesia mines 2.2 million tons of nickel or 59.45% of the global total mining in 2024.** This number rises significantly from 130.000 tons or around 5.7% of the global total mining in 2015 (AEER, 2026). GoI has prioritized nickel downstream industrialization to support its participation in the global EV value chain, including through export restrictions on raw nickel ore and the development of domestic processing facilities as reflected in MEMR Regulation Number 11 of 2019 on Mineral and Coal Mining Operation. This policy has attracted substantial investment in nickel smelters, battery manufacturing, and EV supply chains. Nonetheless, in 2025, approximately 83% of Indonesia's nickel output was directed to the stainless sector, rather than the EV manufacturing industry (CREA, 2026).

However, the role of critical minerals as an enabler of fossil fuel transition depends on how these industries are developed. Many processing facilities remain heavily reliant on coal-fired power plants to meet their energy demand, particularly in industrial parks, which is legally allowed until 2050 as reflected in the Presidential Regulation Number 112 of 2022. Around 68 $MtCO_2$ (12.3% of national greenhouse gases emission) is generated from captive CFPPs located in Sulawesi only (AEER, 2025) The number shows a paradox where the materials intended to support renewable energy technologies are produced through carbon-intensive processes. **Without a clear pathway to decarbonize mineral processing and industrial energy consumption, the climate benefits of downstream industries significantly decrease.**

The expansion of mining and processing activities presents environmental and social challenges, including deforestation, biodiversity loss, and impacts on local and Indigenous communities. Critical minerals mining operation has resulted in an average of 20% forest loss globally within 15 years. Along the mining stages, deforestation drives 37%-98% of carbon footprints. The **worst deforestation occurs in unprotected forest and unrecognized Indigenous and local communities' forest**, as land conversion permits can be granted to the mining companies, thus the deforestation can be legally executed. In Central Sulawesi, the critical minerals processing industry has caused serious land degradation, which is severely impacting the quality of life of the local communities, especially whose livelihood is dependent on natural resources. Moreover, **the negative impacts of critical mineral industry towards the local environment undermines the adaptive capacity of the local community to deal with hydrometeorological disasters, such as floods and drought.**

Readiness in Phasing-In Renewable Energy

Indonesia has already initiated several measures to reduce the country's dependence on fossil fuels in its energy system. While higher ambition in phasing down fossil fuels is needed, looking at the country's readiness in carrying out the transition to renewable energy is equally important to ensure long-term sustainability. The country's state of readiness can be assessed from various aspects, including human capital, finance, infrastructure, and the role of the subnational actors.

1. Human Capital

By 2050, the shift toward renewable energy is anticipated to generate 3.2 million new jobs, including 1.2 million specialized technical positions across the bioenergy, hydro, solar, and wind sectors (IESR, 2024). However, **ensuring an equitable transition demands more than merely creating green jobs; it requires comprehensive reskilling programs, active placement in emerging industries, and a robust safety net to safeguard workers displaced from fossil-fuel-reliant livelihoods** (Partnership for Action on Green Economy, 2023).

The geographic skills gap fundamentally mirrors the structural challenges in Indonesia's just energy transition. **Provinces outside Java—where most renewable energy resources (geothermal, hydro, solar) and dedieselization target sites are heavily concentrated—have significantly weaker training infrastructure, fewer certified instructors, and limited access to professional certification bodies.** This disparity creates a compounding systemic problem: the remote and archipelagic regions that most urgently need decentralized renewable energy deployment to replace inefficient, high-cost diesel generation are simultaneously the ones with the least institutional capacity to deliver.(HRnetRimbun, 2026).

Furthermore, **Indonesia lacks a comprehensive framework that governs a just transition for affected workers.** This legal vacuum has created a gap in regulations regarding the provision of information, protection for informal workers—especially outsourced and seasonal workers—freedom of association, and training to address their circumstances, which cannot be adequately addressed by relying solely on existing regulations. Worker anxiety regarding voluntary entry into the renewable energy industry is rooted in the precarious nature of emerging project-based roles, which often **lack the formal employment guarantees necessary to provide long-term security** (ICEL & LBH Bandung, 2025).

A truly just transition mandates that "green jobs" are inherently "decent jobs." **This necessitates strict compliance with formal labor rights, including mandatory enrollment in social security system like BPJS Ketenagakerjaan (ensuring coverage for occupational injuries, death, and**

old-age pensions) and BPJS Kesehatan. Without rigorous enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) standards—particularly in high-risk downstream critical mineral processing and remote renewable energy installations—vulnerable workers are left exposed.

Initiatives such as the Indonesia-Germany ISED Project, the GFA Renewable Energy Skills Development, and the JETP Framework are actively directing resources toward improving human capital for the energy transition. Ultimately, a just transition involves continuous stakeholder dialogue, comprehensive skill-building, and non-negotiable worker protections.

2. Finance

Acknowledging that public finance and international funding will not be adequate to support Indonesia's long-term energy transition, **mobilizing other source of domestic finance becomes very critical. Therefore, the role of the financial sector needs to be strengthened**. Though Indonesia's financial sector has shown growth, the progress towards Indonesia's long-term energy transition remains slow. The banking sector's preference for investing in government bonds indicates that its role is not functioning optimally. On the other hand, the non-bank financial sector, such as pension and insurance, experiences slow growth progress due to lack of public trust and low public awareness on long-term financial instruments, among others. **Deepening the role of the financial sector requires bridging the gap between the supply (financial sector) and the demand sides (just energy transition projects/programs).** GoI is expected to provide the enabling environment to address this gap, such as through a well-regulated **blended finance mechanism.**

The subnational governments' reliance on fiscal transfer from the national government through the special allocation fund (DAK), should not stop the subnational governments from securing additional financing beyond public sources. **Although sectoral DAK schemes offer funding opportunities for small-scale renewable energy development, accessing the funding is a challenge.** Accessing this funding requires a feasibility study to justify the need for the proposed funding. Yet, the subnational governments are generally lacking the financial and technical capacity necessary to establish proper feasibility studies, thereby restricting access to available funding.

Aside from that, funding from the public source (such as DAK) **mostly focuses on the infrastructure construction phase, with pre- and post-construction receiving insufficient funding**[1]. If the subnational governments do not realize the responsibilities that they need to carry after the construction phase, the possibility for renewable energy projects at the subnational level to be sustainable is low and often ends up in project failure. The subnational governments could also access international development support. However, the type of fundings available is often limited to the construction phase; limited fundings are available to fund the pre-construction phase, but none is available for post-construction phase. **While there are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which can provide funding, most of them are in the form of loans, adding more debt burdens to subnational fiscal capacity.**

There are opportunities in mobilizing local finance through regional development banks (BPD), regional-owned enterprises (BUMD), village-owned enterprises (BUMDes), and cooperatives; however, these institutions will need to build their capacity related to financing renewable energy and the use of green finance instruments.

3. Infrastructure

Indonesia's archipelagic landscape presents a significant barrier to accelerating just energy transition. The national grid does not reach isolated regions in the country, leaving households without reliable access to energy. The distribution and transmission challenges are also caused by the scattered settlements, such as in East Nusa Tenggara. Geographical condition adds challenges related to technical maintenance, i.e., access to spare parts for the community who live in isolated regions. **These communities often need to travel to the nearest urban center to obtain replacements for spare parts. It increases the maintenance cost, while funding availability for the maintenance is limited.** This condition often undermines the sustainability and reliability of renewable energy services in these types of regions.

[1] Renewable energy development can be divided into three phases i.e., pre-construction, construction, and post-construction. Pre-construction phase includes preparation, community engagement and commitment, feasibility study, permitting and licensing. The construction phase covers infrastructure procurement, construction and operation. Post-construction phase includes community participation, maintenance, and evaluation.

Another technical challenge lies in the intermittent characteristics of variable renewable energy, such as solar, hydro, and wind power. **The intermittency requires the capacity to accurately predict real-time energy production from these variable resources, especially if it is connected to the grid. Weather sensing equipment and its integration with the communication system at PLN's control center becomes essential.** In addition, these systems need to be supported by other baseload generation resources that can provide continuous and reliable power generation to ensure supply stability. **In the case of off-grid intermittent renewable energy, BESS is needed yet requires higher investment.** Batteries need to be replaced periodically nonetheless, which brings us back to Indonesia's geographical challenges to distribute the technology to the isolated regions.

4. The Role of Subnational Actors

Subnational actors in Indonesia are the ones who implement the just energy transition, eventually; although most policies and regulations are decided at the national level. The subnational actors have demonstrated just energy transition initiatives, such as through community-based micro hydro and solar energy. However, their participation is very limited due to **insufficient legal authority in the energy sector, financing, technical capacity, and human capital.** In Indonesia, the role of the subnational governments is limited to substantially intervene in the energy planning process. The Law Number 23 of 2014 on Subnational Government is the main law that regulates the scope of subnational authority. Although the energy sector is classified as an optional government affair under this regulation, **the relevant authority is largely delegated to the provincial government, which acts as the extension of the central government in the regions.**

The Government of Indonesia has issued a Presidential Regulation Number 11 of 2023 on Additional Concurrent Government Affairs in the Energy and Mineral Resources Sector within the New and Renewable Energy subsector. According to the regulation, most decision-making authorities remain concentrated at the national and provincial levels. Regency and municipal governments are given very limited responsibilities. Even at the provincial level, authority is largely restricted to coordination functions and facilitating cross-regency/municipal issues. The provincial governments are mandated to issue recommendations geothermal activities and to oversee the management of biomass, biogas, and other renewable energy resources. However, these energy resources are generally located within regency and municipal jurisdictions, which are not under the provincial government's direct administrative authority.

The centralistic nature in Indonesia's energy sector is also reflected through the SOE's control in the electricity system—in this case the PLN—which becomes the primary hurdle of non-SOE's participation in renewable energy development. Law Number 30 of 2009 on Electricity enables PLN to control most of the *wilayah usaha* (WILUS)—designated geographic area where an entity has the exclusive right to generate, distribute and sell electricity—which limits the room for subnational governments to execute just energy transition initiatives in their regions. **Although other stakeholders may develop renewable energy in non-WILUS areas, they experience barriers in transmitting electricity across PLN networks.** Power-wheeling has been advocated as the energy transition enabler, particularly through the current process of Electricity Law revision.

Moreover, the guidelines of Norm, Standard, Procedure, and Criteria (NSPK) are established by the central government. While such a centralized approach is intended to ensure synchronization and compliance in public services and administrative operations across all regions, **unclear and/or the absence of NSPK creates an implementation challenge at the subnational level since the subnational governments require proper guidance to implement their roles. In addition, the National Strategic Projects (PSN) reinforce a more centralized approach to infrastructure development, including in the energy sector.** In the context of PSN, the subnational governments have limited involvement in the planning phase as well as in the implementation place. However, they are unable to decline the project even when it does not reflect the local energy transition needs and priorities. If these projects—some of which are GHG emissions intensive—generate environmental/social harms, the subnational governments are often expected to manage the impacts, despite not being properly consulted prior to the project implementation.



Recommendations

- Contextualizing the global Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in a Just, Orderly, and Equitable Manner into national and local realities

  ➔ In the case of Indonesia, with the B50 policy, **synergy between the roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels and the roadmap for halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030** to prevent conflicting mitigation results, as well as other potential competition such as between food and energy security, is crucial. It is also important to ensure that the applied safeguards are interconnected to avoid shifting burdens onto the forest, land, and community;
  ➔ Ensure that the **roadmap development does not undermine the local adaptation capacity**;
  ➔ Promote **dedieselizaton program as one the efforts to transition away from fossil fuels**, attracting international support to accelerate to progress;
  ➔ **Acknowledge different levels of readiness** across regions and **identify necessary enabling conditions** (such as finance, capacity building, technology, or institutional capacity);
  ➔ Establish **regional dialogue in Asia** to explore international cooperation opportunities and to understand what fossil fuels transition means for the region considering shared challenges among countries i.e., growing economy with important role in global energy transition.

- Ensuring human capital readiness in carrying out and adapting with the energy transition policies and programs

  ➔ Strengthen **collaboration with industry and state-owned enterprises** to ensure workers' absorption;
  ➔ Necessitate **strict compliance with formal labor rights**, including by the provision of proper social protection for workers;
  ➔ **Institutionalize Green Human Resource Management (GHRM)** across public and private sectors to prevent operational incompetence and labour exploitation.

- Optimizing the role of subnationals actors in the implementation phase

  ➔ **Provide clear and consistent guidance** on operationalizing the subnational governments' role and authority in the context of operationalizing just energy transition at the subnational level;
  ➔ **Bridge the gap of implementation capacity** of the subnational actors through the provision of finance, technical support, capacity building, and institutional capacity;
  ➔ **Improve the knowledge of local financial institutions,** such as local banks, regional- and village-owned enterprises regarding relevant finance instruments for just energy transition;
  ➔ **Mobilize political will of the local government** to accelerate just energy transition within their administrative jurisdiction.

- Assessing the linkage between mineral processing, energy transition, and deforestation.

  ➔ **Strengthen the environmental safeguards, responsible mining practices, transparent governance** to prevent social and environmental harm from foreign and domestic critical minerals investment, as well as maintaining and continuously improving the local capacity on adaptation;

- ➔ **Align critical mineral processing with sustainability principles** to ensure that Indonesia will not only benefits economically from the global energy transition but also contributes to just transition in the critical mineral value chain;
- ➔ **Ensure forest preservation** in critical minerals mining and processing, underscoring the roles of forest as habitat for biodiversity, livelihood provider for Indigenous and local communities, and as carbon sequester to strengthen climate resilience;
- ➔ **Exclude areas with high conservation value from mining concessions** to minimize the pressure of deforestation by mainstreaming IBSAP 2025-2045 to protect ecosystems with high biodiversity values outside designated conservation areas.

- Momentum to watch

  - ➔ **UN General Assembly (UNGA) (8-22 September 2026):** demonstrate high-level political message on just energy transition target and implementation;
  - ➔ **CBD COP17 (19-20 October 2026):** align the narrative of roadmap for halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 with the roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels, ensuring the narrative reinforces the enabling condition and safeguards of the fossil fuels transition;
  - ➔ **Pre-COP31 (5-8 October 2026):** Fiji will host the Pre-COP meeting in Nadi, with a Leaders' component to be held in Tuvalu, critical to build momentum and shape discussions ahead of COP31. Enga
  - ➔ **COP31 (9-20 November 2026):** the launch of the global roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels; ensure clarity on post-COP31 implementation and tracking.

Contributors (in alphabetical order)

Azka Syamila (Aksi Ekologi & Emansipasi Rakyat), Hardhana Dinaring Danastri (Indonesia Research Institute for Decarbonization), Henriette Imelda (Indonesia Research Institute for Decarbonization), Marsa Albar (Indonesia Center for Environmental Law), Saffanah Rezky Azzahrah Andrian (Indonesia Center for Environmental Law), Syaharani (independent researcher), Timotius Rafael (Aksi Ekologi & Emansipasi Rakyat), Torry Kuswardono (Yayasan PIKUL)

Further Readings

AEER. 2025. *Dari Captive ke Grid Hijau: Peran Industri Nikel dalam Dekarbonisasi Sistem Kelistrikan Sulawesi.* Aksi Ekologi dan Emansipasi Rakyat: Jakarta.

AEER. 2026. *AEER 2025 Year-End Report: Decarbonization of the Nickel Industry : Emissions from Captive Coal-Fired Power Plants, HPAL Expansion, and the Supply Chain Due Diligence Agenda.* Aksi Ekologi dan Emansipasi Rakyat: Jakarta.

IRID. 2024. *Discussion Paper: Peran Pemerintah Daerah Sulawesi Tengah dalam Menyelaraskan Aksi Iklim Daerah dengan Target Iklim Indonesia.* Indonesia Research Institute for Decarbonization.

IRID. 2024. *Discussion Paper: Menyelaraskan Aksi Iklim Daerah dengan Target Iklim Indonesia (Provinsi Sulawesi Tengah).* Indonesia Research Institute for Decarbonization.

IRID, ICEL, PIKUL, AEER. 2025. *Briefing Paper: The Role of Subnationals in Implementing NDC: Lessons Learned from Indonesia*

IRID, PIKUL. 2024. *Laporan Kajian: Transisi Energi Berkeadilan di Nusa Tenggara Timur.*

IRID, PIKUL. 2025. *Laporan Kajian: Peran Daerah di dalam Pencapaian Target Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) Indonesia.*